An inter-country comparison of unofficial payments: results of a health sector social audit in the Baltic States by Cockcroft, Anne et al.
BioMed  Central
Page 1 of 12
(page number not for citation purposes)
BMC Health Services Research
Open Access Research article
An inter-country comparison of unofficial payments: results of a 
health sector social audit in the Baltic States
Anne Cockcroft1, Neil Andersson*2, Sergio Paredes-Solís2, Dawn Caldwell3, 
Steve Mitchell3, Deborah Milne3, Serge Merhi4, Melissa Roche3, 
Elena Konceviciute5 and Robert J Ledogar6
Address: 1CIETeurope, PO Box 8636, London SW6 2ZB, UK, 2Centro de Investigación de Enfermedades Tropicales, Universidad Autónoma de 
Guerrero, Acapulco, México, 3CIETcanada, 319-1 Stewart Street, Ottawa, K1N 6N5, Canada, 4CIET Trust, 71 Oxford Road, Saxonwold, 
Johannesburg, 2196, South Africa, 5Specialjuju Tyrimu Tarnyba (STT), Vilnius, Lithuania and 6CIETinternational, 511 Avenue of the Americas, 
#132, New York, NY 10011, USA
Email: Anne Cockcroft - acockcroft@ciet.org; Neil Andersson* - neil@ciet.org; Sergio Paredes-Solís - sparedes@ciet.org; 
Dawn Caldwell - dcaldwell@ciet.org; Steve Mitchell - steve@ciet.org; Deborah Milne - dmilne@ciet.org; Serge Merhi - SergeFM@cs.com; 
Melissa Roche - mcroche@email.unc.edu; Elena Konceviciute - Elena@stt.lt; Robert J Ledogar - rledogar@ciet.org
* Corresponding author    
Abstract
Background: Cross-country comparisons of unofficial payments in the health sector are sparse.
In 2002 we conducted a social audit of the health sector of the three Baltic States.
Methods: Some 10,320 household interviews from a stratified, last-stage-random, sample of 30
clusters per country, together with institutional reviews, produced preliminary results. Separate
focus groups of service users, nurses and doctors interpreted these findings. Stakeholder
workshops in each country discussed the survey and focus group results.
Results: Nearly one half of the respondents did not consider unofficial payments to health workers
to be corruption, yet one half (Estonia 43%, Latvia 45%, Lithuania 64%) thought the level of
corruption in government health services was high. Very few (Estonia 1%, Latvia 3%, Lithuania 8%)
admitted to making unofficial payments in their last contact with the services. Around 14% of
household members across the three countries gave gifts in their last contact with government
services.
Conclusion:  This social audit allowed comparison of perceptions, attitudes and experience
regarding unofficial payments in the health services of the three Baltic States. Estonia showed least
corruption. Latvia was in the middle. Lithuania evidenced the most unofficial payments, the greatest
mistrust towards the system. These findings can serve as a baseline for interventions, and to
compare each country's approach to health service reform in relation to unofficial payments.
Background
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania reformed their health sys-
tems after emerging from the Soviet Union, where health
care was characterised by a virtually exclusive role for the
state in financing and delivery. There are common fea-
tures to the reforms in three Baltic States. At the time of
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this project in 2002, a central ministry was responsible for
overall health policy and a publicly-controlled insurance
fund financed health care. Primary care was provided by
family doctors reimbursed on a capitation basis, who
were the gate-keepers for access to specialist services. In
2002, health services were still in transition with efforts at
decentralisation, cost recovery and privatisation all in play
to varying degrees.
Estonia is the smallest of the Baltic countries with a pop-
ulation of 1.3 million. It is also the most prosperous, with
a per capita GNI at the time of the study (2002) of $4,140
(compared with Latvia $3,660 and Lithuania $3,480 in
the same year, World Bank Atlas method, current US$).
The Ministry of Social Affairs was responsible for health
care. The Estonian Health Insurance Fund (EHIF), a pub-
lic independent body, funded most primary, secondary
and tertiary health care. EHIF paid for medical examina-
tions and services, benefits in cases of temporary incapac-
ity to work, part of the costs of prescribed medicines, and
some health promotion activities [1-3]. Family doctors
had the status of independent contractors [1,4] and
almost all health services operated under contract with
EHIF. In 2002 most hospitals were still owned by munic-
ipal governments, however, which ran them as limited
companies or non-profit organizations. In addition to
employed people, the EHIF also covered spouses of the
insured, pensioners, children, disabled people, pregnant
women and persons registered as unemployed [5]. Health
care was officially free for all legal residents, except for a
small consultation fee. Certain fees, such as those for visits
to specialists, for home visits by family doctors, and hos-
pital bed fees came into force since 2002.
Latvia lies between its two neighbours not only geograph-
ically bur also in terms of population (2.4 million) with a
per capita GNI lower than Estonia's but roughly the same
as that of Lithuania. At the time of the survey, the Latvia
State Compulsory Health Insurance Agency (SCHIA)
administered all government health care. Health care
funds were controlled by SCHIA and disbursed through
eight regional Sick Funds which contracted the various
health care providers. Secondary and tertiary care were
centralized and provided by national and municipal facil-
ities, as well as private clinics. All Latvian citizens, perma-
nent residents and those who have paid income tax for
more than six months were entitled to a minimum basket
of health care services which was revised every year [6,7].
All patients paid small consultation fees. Many proce-
dures, however, required patient co-payments and some,
such as dental care, joint replacement and infertility treat-
ment were not covered at all.
Lithuania is the largest of the three countries in surface
area and population (3.5 million). In 1994–95, Lithuania
shifted the administration of health care services from the
Ministry of Health to the ten counties. At the time of the
social audit, the counties were in charge of the enforce-
ment of the state health programs. Municipalities were
responsible for primary health care (through family phy-
sicians) and for running small and medium size hospitals
within their localities [8]. Financing for all public health
care institutions, on the other hand, was centralised in the
Statutory Health Insurance Fund (SHIF) which aimed to
provide all permanent residents with all basic and essen-
tial health services free of charge. However the list of the
specific services considered basic and essential was com-
plex and often a source of confusion [8,9]. Users paid fully
for certain services including dentistry, certification of
health status, acupuncture, treatment of alcohol abuse,
cosmetic procedures, therapeutic abortions and some
nursing services. Numbers of private health care providers
increased more rapidly in Lithuania than in the other Bal-
tic countries [8,12].
Petty corruption in the health sector can manifest in sev-
eral practices, including unofficial payments, salaries of
"phantom" workers, use of official time for private con-
sultations and privatisation of public supplies and serv-
ices [10]. The exact mixture varies considerably from place
to place, requiring local evidence to generate solutions for
a particular context. Corruption in health care in countries
of the former Soviet Union was recognised as a problem
[10]. Studies on corruption in the health sector have been
increasing [11,12], but one of the most recent reviews
noted the surprisingly fragmented nature of the evidence,
the lack of meaningful indicators for cross country com-
parison, and an absence of critical data at the country level
[13].
Petty corruption – including the need to make unofficial
payments to providers to obtain services [14] – is petty
only in the criminal codes. Cumulatively, petty corruption
can have a massive effect on services delivery. It increases
the cost of key public services, limits access for those least
able to pay [15,16] and inhibits the improvement of serv-
ices and the ability of reforms to increase resources, raise
services quality and responsiveness, increase efficiency,
increase provider satisfaction, and achieve structural
reforms [10,12]. In this way, petty corruption siphons off
financial, technical and human resources that should
maintain and improve the system. Some authors have
argued that informal payments allow the system to func-
tion, but there are convincing arguments that the overall
effects are negative at both individual and system levels
[17]. Identifying and preventing corrupt practices should
improve the functioning of the system and ultimately
improve the well-being of people by building the capacity
of government to meet its stated social and economic
goals.BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:15 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/15
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Partly because it deals with illegal activities, measurement
of unofficial payments is not easy [18-20]. Interviewees
are reluctant to speak about it. In Bulgaria, for example,
around one third of a sample declined to answer these
questions [21]. In Ghana, around one half of interviewees
said they would not report an unofficial payment [22]. It
is also difficult to distinguish between gifts as expressions
of gratitude or as unofficial payments [23,24]. Another
problem is that health service users might themselves not
differentiate official from unofficial payments, as can be
the case when public institutions are used for private
health care. In Bangladesh, for example, unofficial pay-
ments almost invariable accompany official payments
[25]. To avoid this problem, studies of unofficial pay-
ments in this setting have focused on conditions that
should by law be free – in these cases, any payment is
unofficial [26,27].
Attempts to measure unofficial payments have produced
a wide range of results across a number of countries. With
caveats about the comparability of data, Lewis presented
data on unofficial payments from 12 countries in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia – a range between 21% and 91%
[23]. Studies in Tajikistan [28], Russia [29], Bulgaria [21],
Poland [30], Albania [31], Slovakia [32], Hungary [17],
Cambodia [33], South Korea [34], South Africa [35] and
Cameroon [36] reported a range of unofficial payment
rates to health workers from 1% to 85%. The problem
about these studies is that they did not use a standard
methodology – making comparison all but meaningless.
In 2002, we worked with national counterparts in the Bal-
tic States to examine unofficial payments in the health sec-
tor. Our regional social audit had four inter-dependent
objectives: to assemble evidence on the incidence of unof-
ficial payments in the last contact with health services; to
measure the public perception of corruption; to docu-
ment links between perception, attitudes and concrete
experience; and to suggest actionable steps to improve the
situation. This paper reports on the findings of the surveys
in the three countries regarding unofficial payments in
health services, from the perspective of the public and
service users.
Methods
A series of interviews with planners and decision makers
set the limits of the enquiry. The government counterparts
in each country identified the components of health serv-
ice delivery, especially those related to informal pay-
ments, which would benefit from community-based
information. We used the social audit methods developed
by CIET over the last two decades [35,37,38] which collect
information about public services from beneficiaries and
service providers, using this as a basis for involving stake-
holders in discussing the findings and making changes to
improve the services. The methods have been used to
measure impact, coverage and cost in the fields of envi-
ronment [39], urban transport [40], agriculture [41] and
judiciary [42], and for providing evidence for community-
designed strategies to combat corruption in public serv-
ices [43].
Sample and sampling
National statistical departments in each country sup-
ported the sampling process by providing the sampling
frame of enumeration areas based on the most recent cen-
sus. In each country we drew a random cluster sample of
30 enumeration areas, stratified by region and by rural/
urban/capital location. Within each enumeration area the
site comprised some 110 contiguous households, radiat-
ing out from a randomly selected starting point, with no
sub-sampling within the site. This sampling strategy
allows community level variables as well as household
and individual variables to be included in analysis of out-
comes of interest [27,38,44]. The final sample across all
three countries was 10,320 households representing some
25,000 people (Table 1).
Data collection
In May and June 2002 trained local interviewers con-
ducted a household survey in the sample sites to collect
information on household views and individual client
experiences with the health sector. Except for a few coun-
try-specific questions, we used the same survey instrument
across all three countries. After translation into Estonian,
Latvian, Lithuanian, and Russian, independent language
consultants back translated it to check preservation of
Table 1: The sample for the Baltics social audit
Households 
interviewed
People 
represented
Health institutions 
reviewed
Community focus 
groups
Health worker 
focus groups
Estonia 3,388 7,526 33 30 1
Latvia 3,439 8,926 41 30 3
Lithuania 3,493 8,541 30 30 2
TOTAL 10,320 24,993 104 90 6BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:15 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/15
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meaning. The instrument asked households whether they
considered unofficial payments to health care profession-
als as corruption, how they rated corruption in govern-
ment health services (on a five point scale from very low
to very high), and whether the level of corruption in
health services had decreased, stayed the same, or
increased in the last three years. We used respondent-esti-
mated household income to illustrate the likely economic
impact on the population of health care costs, including
gifts and unofficial payments. The interviewer asked:
"Adding up the incomes of all the household members,
what is the average monthly income of this household?"
Adult members of households gave information about
their last contact with health services during the last five
months (this coincided with the beginning of the calendar
year), as a period for which they were likely to have rea-
sonable recall. They answered questions about the type of
contact, the type of health service, and their time on any
waiting list. Questions about official and unofficial pay-
ments and gifts (separately) included timing, amounts,
recipients, and perceived effects.
Trained facilitators returned to each sample community
and conducted a focus group discussion with community
members. They present key findings from the household
survey to the participants and to invite their views and
suggestions for improvements. We also conducted focus
groups of doctors and nurses (two groups in Lithuania,
three groups in Latvia and one group in Estonia) to
explore their views about the findings and to seek their
suggestions for corrective strategies. In each focus group a
reporter took notes during the discussion and the facilita-
tor and reporter together prepared a report on each focus
group. We translated the focus group reports into English
and a small group of researchers in each country (includ-
ing nationals of that country) went through the reports
and identified emerging themes.
Analysis
We calculated frequencies of key outcomes for each coun-
try, including household opinions of the government
health services, their rating of corruption in these services,
and government service users' reports of making unoffi-
cial payments or giving gifts. We investigated variables
related to these outcomes using multiple logistic regres-
sion analysis (step-down from a saturated model) to iden-
tify possible risk factors for unofficial payments. The
saturated model included all variables related to the out-
comes in univariate analyses: age, sex and education of
respondents, urban or rural residence, language spoken
(national language or not), whether households consid-
ered their income was sufficient for their needs, and
whether respondents had enough information about their
entitlements.
To facilitate their use in the analysis, we dichotomised
some of the independent variables. Prior experience and
the stakeholder design processes guided this dichotomisa-
tion. We divided age of respondent and of the breadwin-
ner into those below and above 50 years of age; and
education of the respondent and breadwinner into
"basic" (the legal minimum education) and higher.
We used CIETmap [45] for the analysis and population-
weighted raster maps. Contrasts are reported as the odds
ratio (OR), with 95% confidence intervals (CI). The OR
figures shown are the adjusted values from the logistic
regression models. The tables in the main paper showing
OR figures are each derived from the results of several dif-
ferent logistic regression analyses in each of the three
countries. Details of the logistic regression models are
included in the supplementary data file [see Additional
File 1].
Maps and their interpretation
Key findings from community-based questionnaires are
represented in population-weighted raster maps [45]. The
interpretation of these maps is straightforward, not unlike
a weather map. Darker colours on the map represent
higher levels of the indicator being mapped, as if the pop-
ulation represented by each selected site were 'spread out'
on the geographic surface. The positions of colour
changes between sample sites are determined by a process
of interpolation, taking into account the relative popula-
tions of sites. Population weighting thus transforms the
geographic space into population space. For example, if
30% of the map falls into a given range of the indicator,
then 30% of the population of the country falls within
that range. As with a standard weather map, trends are
much more accurate than the exact location of any con-
tour gradient. In interpreting the maps, one should not be
looking at the colour at a specific point, but at the colour
change trends.
Communication of Results
In each of the three countries, stakeholders, including
health officials, health providers and representatives of
civil society, participated in workshops to discuss the sur-
vey results and identify items that could be acted on to
make positive changes to the system. A communication
strategy in each country proposed main actionable find-
ings.
Ethical review
The CIETinternational Ethical Review Board reviewed and
approved the project in May 2002.BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:15 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/15
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Results
Perceptions of unofficial payments
Only about half the households thought an unofficial
payment to a health care professional was a form of cor-
ruption, with little difference between the three countries
(Table 2). More than a third of households across the
region (Estonia 44%, Latvia 38%, and Lithuania 34%)
said they would be willing to report health care profes-
sionals who demanded unofficial payments. A high pro-
portion declined to respond to this question or said they
did not know what they would do (Estonia 15.5%, Latvia
16.3% and Lithuania 7.2%.)
The community focus groups reflected this ambivalence
about whether unofficial payments to health care workers
were a form of corruption. An exchange in a group in Esto-
nia illustrates this: "It's not corruption if you pay after-
wards" to which another person replied: "You pay well
and the next time they are waiting for you already. It is
corruption." Some thought it was not corruption unless
the payment was requested "If I pay my own money and
no one is demanding it from me, I don't think this is cor-
ruption." In the focus groups of doctors and nurses there
was also disagreement about whether unofficial payments
were corruption, with some participants suggesting that
payments in cash or kind after treatment represented grat-
itude rather than corruption, and others pointing to the
long tradition of paying health workers.
When households were asked their opinions about cor-
ruption in the government health services, a significant
minority in each country felt unable to give a rating (Esto-
nia 36%, Latvia 28%, Lithuania 12%). Of those that gave
an opinion, more people in Lithuania thought the level of
corruption was high or very high (Table 3). In Estonia and
Latvia, respondents speaking the national language were
less likely to rate corruption as high (Table 4) [see Addi-
tional File 1]. Similarly, many people were unable to say
if corruption in the health services had changed in the last
three years (Estonia 42%, Latvia 39%, Lithuania 23%),
but of those who gave an opinion, more people in Lithua-
nia considered it had increased (Estonia 49% (846/1715),
Latvia 50% (1032/2053), Lithuania 57% (1527/2659).
Prevalence of unofficial payments and gifts
Despite these attitudes and perceptions, very few house-
hold members who had used government health services
in the first five months of 2002 said they had made an
unofficial payment in their last contact (Table 5). The
reported number of unofficial payments was lowest in
Estonia (0.7%) and highest in Lithuania (8%). Figure 1
shows the geographical variation in the proportion of
service users making unofficial payments. The highest
rates were in the south and west of Lithuania. In all three
countries, unofficial payments were more frequently
reported in contacts with specialist doctors, and half or
more of the payments were made before or during the
treatment (Table 5). Declining to answer the question was
uneven across three countries (Estonia 12.3%, Latvia
1.7%, and Lithuania 8.1%).
The community and health worker focus groups discussed
the low rate of reported unofficial payments from the
household survey. Many community focus group partici-
pants thought the actual rate of making unofficial pay-
ments for health care was higher: "You cannot get any
attention in a hospital these days if you don't bribe some-
one there" (Lithuania). They suggested that people may
be unwilling to admit to making unofficial payments:
"Who wants to confess?" (Estonia); "People did not want
to admit they paid because they got something back as a
benefit from payment." (Latvia)
By contrast, in Lithuania, the doctors and nurses suggested
the 8% rate of unofficial payments was an over-estimate:
"People don't have enough money to pay – there is just a
lot of talk about it." and "If gifts are included, these num-
bers are about right." But in Latvia, health workers
thought the rates of unofficial payments from the house-
hold survey were an underestimate: "The actual number
who pay is higher, but mainly for expensive specialists."
In Estonia, doctors considered the low reported rate of
unofficial payments may reflect reality: "Only very desper-
ate people are doing this."
Giving gifts was more common, and in this case did not
vary much between the three countries, with around 14%
of respondents in each country reporting they gave a gift
in their last contact with government health services. Gifts
were more common in specialist care than in general care,
and most of the gifts were given after treatment (Table 5).
Figure 2 shows the geographical spread of giving gifts.
Table 2: Proportion of households that consider unofficial payments to be corruption
Number of households responding Number (%) that considers unofficial payments to be corruption
Estonia 2851 1588 (56)
Latvia 3015 1529 (51)
Lithuania 3205 1774 (55)BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:15 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/15
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In all three countries, those who gave gifts were at least
three times more likely to have also made an unofficial
payment. In Latvia and Lithuania, respondents with more
education were more than twice as likely to report making
an unofficial payment (Table 6) [See Additional File 1].
Relative value of unofficial payments and gifts
Table 7 presents the unofficial payments made by those
who said they made such payments during their most
recent encounter with government health services. For
comparison purposes we also record estimated monthly
household income among all those who made either
unofficial payments or gifts. In Latvia the median unoffi-
cial payment was 6% and in Lithuania 9% of median
declared monthly income.
The vast majority of gifts (Estonia 98%, Latvia 95%,
Lithuania 93%) were in kind (candy, flowers, liquor, etc)
rather than in money. Respondents who gave gifts were
asked to estimate the value of the gift. The Euro equivalent
of these estimates, also presented in Table 7, represents
from 1% to 4% of monthly household income.
We asked all respondents what they considered the maxi-
mum acceptable value of a gift to a health care profes-
sional. Up to one third in each country would not agree to
any size gift (Estonia 31%, Latvia 31%, and Lithuania
23%). Among those who considered gift giving permissi-
ble, acceptable values mentioned were similar to those of
the actual gifts given.
Benefits derived from unofficial payments
People who made unofficial payments in government
health services answered a separate question about the
benefit they received from making the payment. Some
reported positive results such as quicker service, better
quality of service and a personal sense of satisfaction or
expressed gratitude from the health professional. How-
ever, a sizeable minority of those who made an unofficial
payment said they did not receive any benefit from doing
so (Estonia, 1/12; Latvia, 26/77; Lithuania, 49/177).
Willingness to pay
Table 8 shows the percentages of those households who
said they were willing to pay for specific changes
(improvements) in family doctor services and specialist
services they would like to see, and the maximum
amounts they would be willing to pay for these improve-
ments. Among those who were willing to pay, the median
amounts ranged from 1% to 3% of median declared
monthly household income. A large proportion did not
answer this question (Estonia 16.1%, Latvia 41.7% and
Lituania 14.7%).
In addition, households were specifically asked if they
would be willing to pay to avoid waiting lists for surgery
or other hospital treatment. More than one half of house-
holds said they would be willing to pay for this, especially
in Estonia (Estonia 62%, 1918/3100; Latvia 56%, 1730/
3086; Lithuania 51%, 1695/3309). Figure 3 shows how
willingness to pay to avoid waiting lists for surgery is dis-
tributed geographically. The greatest willingness to pay
appeared in the more prosperous northern area of Estonia
and in Riga, the capital of Latvia. In the relatively poorer
Lithuania, people were least willing to pay. In all three
countries, respondents under the age of 50 years were
three or four times more likely than older people to be
willing to pay to avoid waiting lists, and households
reporting enough income for their needs were more likely
to be willing to pay (Table 9) [See Additional File 1].
Table 3: Proportion of households that consider the level of corruption in the health services to be high
Number of households responding Number (%) that considers level of 
corruption to be high
Estonia 2004 863 (43)
Latvia 2446 1092 (45)
Lithuania 3045 1957 (64)
Table 4: Variables related to household perception of corruption in government health services as high
Related variable Adjusted Odds Ratios (95% CI)
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
Speaking national language OR 0.78 (0.63–0.96) OR 0.74 (0.62–0.89)
Having enough knowledge about entitlements OR 0.73 (0.61–0.89) OR 0.75 (0.63–0.90)
The OR and 95% CI are the adjusted values from logistic regression analysis. See Methods for the variables included in the analysis and details of the 
models from individual countries in the supplementary tablesBMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:15 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/15
Page 7 of 12
(page number not for citation purposes)
Community focus groups discussed the findings about
paying to avoid waiting lists and whether it was fair or
right for people to do this. Some participants thought it
was fine to jump the queue if you could afford to pay: "I
can pay, and I am going before others; let the others wait."
(Latvia). Others thought it was unfair for those who could
not afford to pay: "If I have money, I get served first, and
if I am poor, I can wait forever?" (Lithuania) or that it
would only be acceptable if there were two separate sys-
tems or if people who could pay went privately "People
who can pay may do this but the doctors should deal with
them after official working hours" (Estonia). Some men-
tioned that such payments should not be necessary as
people paid taxes for their health care: "If we did not have
to pay taxes, it would be okay to pay extra." (Lithuania)
Focus groups of health workers often expressed that they
were not in favour of people paying to avoid waiting lists,
but recognised it was happening. Some thought the possi-
bility to pay could be made official: "Anyway, people are
paying to skip waiting: it has to be made official" (Latvia).
Others thought the practice should be stopped: "It is
unfair to those who cannot pay. It should be stopped and
people who allow it to happen must be punished."
(Lithuania), and others suggested there should be a sepa-
rate system for those paying: "It has to be working out of
official hours" (Estonia)
Table 5: Service users who gave unofficial payments and gifts in their last contact with government health services: type of care and 
timing of payments
Unofficial payments Gifts
Number of service users responding Number (%) making unofficial payments Number of service users responding Number (%) giving gifts
Overall: Overall:
Estonia 2456 18 (0.7) 2475 309 (13)
Latvia 3177 96 (3) 3185 436 (14)
Lithuania 2553 211 (8) 2588 349 (14)
By type of care: By type of care:
General care Specialist care General care Specialist care
Estonia 2435 3/1338 (0.2) 14/1097 (1.3) 2454 146/1360 (11) 161/1094 (15)
Latvia 3143 39/2004 (2) 54/1139 (5) 3150 220/1999 (11) 212/1151 (18)
Lithuania 2511 66/1229 (5) 140/1282 (11) 2548 151/1249 (12) 193/1299 (15)
By timing during treatment: By timing during treatment:
Before/during After Before/during After
Estonia 8/16 (50) 8/16 (50) 49/292 (17) 243/292 (83)
Latvia 42/89 (47) 47/89 (53) 128/423 (30) 295/423 (70)
Lithuania 133/198 (67) 65/198 (33) 106/335 (32) 229/335 (68)
Geographical distribution of unofficial payments made during  most recent contact with government health services Figure 1
Geographical distribution of unofficial payments 
made during most recent contact with government 
health services. This is a population weighted raster map of 
percent of households who made an unofficial payment in 
last contact with government health services, showing trends 
for the variable rather than absolute values at any given point 
on the map.
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Discussion
Study limitations
This study has the well known limitations of a cross-sec-
tional study. It provides a snapshot of the situation at one
time point during a period of adaptation to post-Soviet
conditions. All household information is based on self-
reporting and some respondents may have been reluctant
to admit making unofficial payments. Focus group partic-
ipants in Latvia and Lithuania felt that unofficial pay-
ments were under-reported, mainly because people did
not want to admit to making these payments. Another
reason for under-reporting unofficial payments is that
people may not be aware of which payments are official
and which are not.
Several authors point to the difficulties of definition and
of under-reporting [15,18-20]. A comparative study,
based on surveys in eight former Soviet Union countries
in 2001 reported a range of out-of-pocket payments
(including money and/or gifts) from 65% and 56% in
Georgia and Armenia, to 8% and 19% in Belarus and Rus-
sia [46]. Our figures for unofficial payments and gifts
combined are comparable with those at the lower end of
this range.
Although we anticipate under-reporting of unofficial pay-
ments, the relative frequency among the three countries is
probably still interpretable. Perceptions of corruption in
the health sector, though much higher than actual report-
ing of informal payments, showed a similar pattern across
the three countries: lowest in Estonia and highest in
Lithuania with Latvia in the middle.
Another problem comes in relating unofficial payments to
health costs and household income. While reliable esti-
mates of absolute household income require much more
complex questioning and documentation [47,48], our
concern was to obtain a measure against which to assess
the relative size of health costs, unofficial payments and
willingness to pay.
Are unofficial payments corruption?
Nearly one half the respondents to our survey did not con-
sider unofficial payments to be corruption. In a separate
Lithuanian study [8], only payments in cash were per-
ceived as bribes. In the household interviews we asked
separately about unofficial payments and gifts, and focus
groups distinguished cash payments and gifts. Among
cash payments both the size of the payment and whether
it was given before or after the service helped to determine
whether it should be considered a bribe or not.
In this cross-sectional study we cannot be sure of the
direction of causality; it could be that giving gifts and
making unofficial payments are both manifestations of
some underlying process. However, the very similar rate
of gifting (13–14%) in the three countries contrasts strik-
Geographical distribution of gifts given during most recent  contact with government health services Figure 2
Geographical distribution of gifts given during most 
recent contact with government health services. This 
is a population weighted raster map of percent of households 
who gave a gift in last contact with government health serv-
ices, showing trends for the variable rather than absolute val-
ues at any given point on the map.
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Table 6: Variables related to unofficial payments in government health services
Related variable Adjusted Odds Ratios (95% CI)
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
Giving a gift OR 11.34 (5.07–25.35) OR 4.04 (2.72–6.00) OR 3.40 (2.52–4.49)
More education OR 2.53 (1.69–3.80) OR 2.10 (1.55–2.86)
Urban residence OR 2.41 (1.45–5.26)
Household income sufficient for needs OR 1.53 (1.04–2.14)
The OR and 95% CI are the adjusted values from logistic regression analysis. See Methods for the variables included in the analysis and details of the 
models from individual countries in the supplementary tablesBMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:15 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/15
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ingly with the very different rates of unofficial payments
across the countries (0.7% in Estonia, 3% in Latvia and
8% in Lithuania). This raises the question whether gifting
influences unofficial payments (rather than vice versa) in
a way that is mediated through the particular health care
reform approaches in the three countries.
Most of the gifts reported in our survey were made in kind,
93% in Lithuania to 98% in Estonia, and were generally
given after treatment. We attempted to estimate the value
of the gifts; in some cases (such as when the gift was sim-
ply a bunch of flowers) this was a somewhat artificial exer-
cise. The median of the estimated value of gifts (including
all types) was a third or less the median value of reported
unofficial payments. In community focus groups in all
three countries, people overwhelmingly supported the
practice of giving gifts to health care professionals, stating
that gifts were an expression of gratitude for care. There is
evidence from other sources of a culture of gift giving in
the context of professional services in regions of the
former Soviet Union [12]. In Estonia, where less than 1%
of respondents reported making unofficial payments, the
level of gift-giving was similar to that of the other two
countries (Table 5 and Figure 2).
But less benign interpretations are possible. Under the
Soviet system, the chief mechanism for rationing health
care was making people wait. Gifts in kind help to estab-
lishing a personal relationship with the caregiver and they
easily lead to favouritism as far as waiting times are con-
cerned [12]. It may be noteworthy that those who gave
gifts were significantly more likely to have also made an
unofficial payment. And there appear to be substantial
minorities in each country that consider it inappropriate
to give gifts of any value at all.
The lack of consensus on whether informal payment is
corruption is a subject for concern. Some believe that the
very lack of consensus encourages corruption [49].
Perceptions vs. actual experience of corruption
In our study, perception of corruption is higher than
actual experiences of unofficial payments in health serv-
ices. This contrast could be explained in part by under-
reporting of unofficial payments actually made as well as
by the fact that the perceptions are based on a lifetime of
experience, information from friends and neighbours and
media reports. But it may also mean that relatively low
levels of corruption in health services have powerful rip-
ple effects in the public opinion. People may also be
including forms of corruption other than petty corruption
when they rate the overall level of corruption in the health
services.
Willingness to pay and the formalisation of informal 
payments
The current discussion as to whether formalisation of
informal payments might lead to a reduction in corrup-
tion [12,50] could be better informed by data concerning
health care users' actual willingness to pay for better serv-
ice. Our survey indicates that in 2002 willingness to pay
was closely related to the ability to pay and that the
Table 8: Willingness to pay for improvements in services of family doctors and specialists
Family doctor Specialist services
Proportion 
willing to pay
Maximum amount willing to pay 
(in Euros)
Proportion 
willing to pay
Maximum amount willing to pay 
(in Euros)
Mean Median Mean Median
Estonia 27% 7 2 40% 5 3
Latvia 55% 4 2 71% 8 3
Lithuania 41% 7 6 35% 9 6
The amounts shown are the mean and median only among those willing to pay anything
Table 7: Value of unofficial payments and gifts compared with monthly household income, in Euros
Payments by individuals, last 
contact w. system
Gifts by individuals, last contact 
with the system
Monthly household income among those 
making unofficial payments or gifts
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Estonia 116 13 7 3 339 256
Latvia 45 17 7 3 393 284
Lithuania 46 20 10 6 320 231BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:15 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/15
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amounts people said they were willing to pay were not
very large (Tables 8 and 9 and Figure 3). Overall, the mar-
gin of acceptance for across-the-board increases in health
service charges, even when accompanied by improve-
ments, appeared to be quite narrow, and even taking into
account the willingness of many to reward individual acts
of good service with gifts.
Conclusion
Estonia, with the simplest health reform structures, evi-
denced the least corruption at both the level of experience
and that of perceptions. Latvia, with higher official user
costs, was in the middle. Lithuania, larger and more com-
plex in its approach to health reform, evidenced the high-
est levels of unofficial payments, and the greatest mistrust
towards the system. As each country pursues its own
approach to health care reform, the information from this
2002 study can serve as a baseline for examining how
effective the different reforms have been in the effort to
control petty corruption.
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Geographical distribution of willingness to pay to avoid wait- ing lists for surgery or other hospital treatment Figure 3
Geographical distribution of willingness to pay to 
avoid waiting lists for surgery or other hospital treat-
ment. This is a population weighted raster map of percent 
of households who would be willing to pay to avoid waiting 
lists for surgery or other hospital treatment, showing trends 
for the variable rather than absolute values at any given point 
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Table 9: Variables related to willingness to pay to avoid a waiting list
Related variable Adjusted Odds Ratios (95% CI)
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
Age less than 50 years OR 4.75 (4.03–5.59) OR 4.73 (4.04–5.55) OR 3.26 (2.78–3.82)
Household income sufficient for needs OR 1.45 (1.22–1.72) OR 1.94 (1.58–2.37) OR 1.52 (1.26–1.85)
The OR and 95% CI are the adjusted values from logistic regression analysis. See Methods for the variables included in the analysis and details of the 
models from individual countries in the supplementary tablesBMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:15 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/15
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